EIP-7688 - Forward compatible consensus data structures

Created 2024-04-15
Status Draft
Category Core
Type Standards Track
Authors
Requires

Abstract

This EIP defines the changes needed to adopt ProgressiveContainer from EIP-7495 and ProgressiveList from EIP-7916 in consensus data structures.

Motivation

Ethereum's consensus data structures make heavy use of Simple Serialize (SSZ) Container, which defines how they are serialized and merkleized. The merkleization scheme allows application implementations to verify that individual fields (and partial fields) have not been tampered with. This is useful, for example, in smart contracts of decentralized staking pools that wish to verify that participating validators have not been slashed.

While SSZ Container defines how data structures are merkleized, the merkleization is prone to change across the different forks. When that happens, e.g., because new features are added or old features get removed, existing verifier implementations need to be updated to be able to continue processing proofs.

ProgressiveContainer, of EIP-7495, is a forward compatible alternative that guarantees a forward compatible merkleization scheme. By transitioning consensus data structures to use ProgressiveContainer, smart contracts that contain verifier logic no longer have to be maintained in lockstep with Ethereum's fork schedule as long as the underlying features that they verify don't change. For example, as long as the concept of slashing is represented using the boolean slashed field, existing verifiers will not break when unrelated features get added or removed. This is also true for off-chain verifiers, e.g., in hardware wallets or in operating systems for mobile devices that are on a different software update cadence than Ethereum.

Specification

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 and RFC 8174.

Container conversion

Container types that are expected to evolve over forks SHALL be redefined as ProgressiveContainer[active_fields=[1] * len(type.fields())].

For example, given a type in the old fork:

class Foo(Container):
    a: uint8
    b: uint16

This type can be converted to support stable Merkleization in the new fork:

class Foo(ProgressiveContainer[active_fields=[1, 1]]):
    a: uint8
    b: uint16

As part of the conversion, a stable generalized index (gindex) is assigned to each field that remains valid in future forks.

List[type, N] / Bitlist conversion

List types frequently have been defined with excessively large capacities N with the intention that N is never reached in practice. In other cases, the capacity itself has changed over time.

As part of the conversion, a stable generalized index (gindex) is assigned to each list element that remains valid regardless of the number of added elements.

Converted types

The following types SHALL be converted to ProgressiveContainer:

Immutable types

These types are used as part of the ProgressiveContainer definitions, and, as they are not ProgressiveContainer themselves, are considered to have immutable Merkleization. If a future fork requires changing these types in an incompatible way, a new type SHALL be defined and assigned a new field name.

Type Description
Slot Slot number on the beacon chain
Epoch Epoch number on the beacon chain, a group of slots
CommitteeIndex Index of a committee within a slot
ValidatorIndex Unique index of a beacon chain validator
Gwei Amount in Gwei (1 ETH = 10^9 Gwei = 10^18 Wei)
Root Byte vector containing an SSZ Merkle root
Hash32 Byte vector containing an opaque 32-byte hash
Version Consensus fork version number
BLSPubkey Cryptographic type representing a BLS12-381 public key
BLSSignature Cryptographic type representing a BLS12-381 signature
KZGCommitment G1 curve point for the KZG polynomial commitment scheme
Fork Consensus fork information
Checkpoint Tuple referring to the most recent beacon block up through an epoch's start slot
Validator Information about a beacon chain validator
AttestationData Vote that attests to the availability and validity of a particular consensus block
Eth1Data Target tracker for importing deposits from transaction logs
DepositData Log data emitted as part of a transaction's receipt when depositing to the beacon chain
BeaconBlockHeader Consensus block header
ProposerSlashing Tuple of two equivocating consensus block headers
Deposit Tuple of deposit data and its inclusion proof
VoluntaryExit Consensus originated request to exit a validator from the beacon chain
SignedVoluntaryExit Tuple of voluntary exit request and its signature
SyncAggregate Cryptographic type representing an aggregate sync committee signature
ExecutionAddress Byte vector containing an account address on the execution layer
Transaction Byte list containing an RLP encoded transaction
WithdrawalIndex Unique index of a withdrawal from any validator's balance to the execution layer
Withdrawal Withdrawal from a beacon chain validator's balance to the execution layer
DepositRequest Tuple of flattened deposit data and its sequential index
WithdrawalRequest Execution originated request to withdraw from a validator to the execution layer
ConsolidationRequest Execution originated request to consolidate two beacon chain validators
BLSToExecutionChange Request to register the withdrawal account address of a beacon chain validator
SignedBLSToExecutionChange Tuple of withdrawal account address registration request and its signature
ParticipationFlags Participation tracker of a beacon chain validator within an epoch
HistoricalSummary Tuple combining a historical block root and historical state root
PendingDeposit Pending operation for depositing to a beacon chain validator
PendingPartialWithdrawal Pending operation for withdrawing from a beacon chain validator
PendingConsolidation Pending operation for consolidating two beacon chain validators

Rationale

Best timing?

Applying this EIP breaks hash_tree_root and Merkle tree verifiers a single time, while promising forward compatibility from the fork going forward. It is best to apply it before merkleization would be broken by different changes. Merkleization is broken by a Container reaching a new power of 2 in its number of fields.

Can this be applied retroactively?

While Profile serializes in the same way as the legacy Container, the merkleization and hash_tree_root of affected data structures changes. Therefore, verifiers that wish to process Merkle proofs of legacy variants still need to support the corresponding legacy schemes.

Immutability

Once a field in a ProgressiveContainer has been published, its name can no longer be used to represent a different type in the future. This is in line with historical management of certain cases:

Furthermore, new fields have to be appended at the end of ProgressiveContainer. This is in line with historical management of other cases:

With ProgressiveContainer, stable Merkleization requires these rules to become strict.

Cleanup opportunity

Several fields in the BeaconState are no longer relevant in current specification versions.

BeaconBlockHeader?

Updating the BeaconBlockHeader to ProgressiveContainer is tricky as is breaks hash_tree_root(latest_block_header) in the BeaconState. One option could be to store latest_block_header_root separately, possibly also incorporating the block proposer signature into the hash to avoid proposer signature checks while backfilling historical blocks.

Validator?

Updating the Validator to ProgressiveContainer would add an extra hash for each validator; validators are mostly immutable so rarely need rehashing. Due to the large hash count, implementations may have to incrementally construct the new Validator entries ahead of the fork. It should be evaluated whether the hashing overhead is worth a clean transition to future fields, e.g., for holding postquantum keys.

Backwards Compatibility

Existing Merkle proof verifiers need to be updated to support the new Merkle tree shape. This includes verifiers in smart contracts on different blockchains and verifiers in hardware wallets, if applicable.

Security Considerations

None

Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.